Iran at a Crossroads

Between Escalation and Accommodation: The Uncertain Trajectory of U.S.–Iran Tensions

By Wirya Hama-Tahir Kurdyar

Although regime change in the Islamic Republic of Iran appears, on the surface, to be the objective, in reality the consequences of a U.S. and Israeli war against Iran remain unclear. This uncertainty stems largely from the fact that U.S. President Donald Trump has not presented a clear and decisive objective. Moreover, Trump is known for quickly shifting his positions and decisions.

The intensity of the attacks suggests that there may be seriousness about changing the regime. However, historical experience shows that there are two primary paths to regime change: foreign intervention and occupation—meaning the occupying power deploys ground forces to carry out the change. The United States does not appear to have such an intention.

The second path is internal uprising and popular revolt. The most recent protests in Iran occurred nearly a month ago, and the conditions for renewed unrest may be more favorable than before. The key question, however, is whether such protests would be strong enough to overthrow the regime. To answer this, one must first examine the structure of Iran’s military and security forces. In a situation of widespread demonstrations, would these forces remain neutral and side with protesters, or would they fiercely defend the regime?

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) functions parallel to Iran’s formal army and is even more powerful. It is essentially an ideological militia, with loyalty primarily to the regime’s ideology rather than to the state itself. Many of Iran’s security institutions were shaped and consolidated under the Islamic Republic. Therefore, regime change through protests alone would be extremely difficult—though not impossible.

A more plausible scenario—one that appears to be favoured by the United States and President Trump more than by Israel—is change within the regime rather than the complete overthrow of the regime. The targeting of hardline factions within the system suggests an intention to weaken them so that the remaining elements might comply in some form and within the framework of an agreement—similar to what occurred with the Venezuelan regime. Iran’s restrained responses also indicate that it does not wish to risk sacrificing the entire regime through strong retaliation that could invite harsher Israeli and American attacks. Such a calibrated response could open the door to a negotiated settlement between Washington and the Iranian regime or its remaining power structure. A commitment by Tehran to halt nuclear enrichment and curb its missile program might be sufficient for Trump, but it would probably fall short of Netanyahu’s objectives.

It is worth recalling that a few days after the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime in 2003, Iranian leaders reportedly offered the United States a proposal: in exchange for Iran not being targeted (after President George W. Bush had labelled it part of the “Axis of Evil”), they were prepared to disarm both Hezbollah and Hamas and meet many other American demands. However, the Sunni insurgency in Iraq changed the situation, and the United States did not move against Iran. Later, the arrival of President Obama and his policies eased some pressure on the Islamic Republic. In short, the leaders of the regime seek to preserve it at any cost during this phase—even if it must be weakened in the process.

Another possible scenario is that continued aerial attacks could trigger massive protests, and if the regime’s response to suppress them escalates, the situation could slide into civil war—particularly if armed opposition forces, whether Persian, Kurdish, Arab, or Baloch, enter the confrontation and directly engage Iran’s military and security forces.